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In Defense of Sell: Involuntary Medication and the
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendant
Lisa ,Km Anh Nguyent

In June 2003, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may be involuntarily medicated solely to render him
competent to stand trial.1 The Court explained that the defendant's liberty interest in avoiding forcible medication must be
balanced against the government's interest in prosecuting the
defendant, concluding that the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs is constitutionally appropriate in some situations.2 But, although the Court held that "the Constitution allows
the Government to administer those drugs, even against the
defendant's will," the Court recognized that these circumstances
were limited, holding that certain conditions must be satisfied
before the government is permitted to engage in such actions.3
The legal scholarship examining this recent decision has
been largely critical.4 Many commentators claim that the
decision fails to adequately protect a criminal defendant's constit B.A. 2003, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of
Chicago.
1 Sell v United States, 539 US 166 (2003).
2 Id at 177-81.
3 Id at 169, 177-81.
4 See, for example, Elizabeth G. Schultz, Note, Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts:
ForcedMedication to Achieve Thal Competency in the Wake ofSell v. United States, 38
Akron L Rev 503, 549 (2005) (arguing that "the Court should have applied strict scrutiny
to forced medication criminal cases"); Aaron R. Dias, Just Say Yes: Sell v. United States
and Inadequate Limitations on the ForcedMedication of Defendants in Order to Render
Competence for Trial, 55 SC L Rev 517, 518 (2004) (arguing that Sell does not "sufficiently protect an individual's bodily integrity"); Scott Ditfurth, Comment, When Can the
Government Force Someone To Be Competent: Sell v. United States, 25 Whittier L Rev
667, 692 (2004) (arguing that the Court "failed to adequately clarify" when nonviolent
defendants can be involuntarily medicated); Adrian Haynes, Broadly Harmful or Rare
Instance: InvoluntaryMedication to Restore Thal Competency afterSell, 5 Loy J Pub Int
L 175, 176 (2004) (arguing that the decision permits "a greater number of defendants to
be involuntarily medicated to stand trial for a broad range of offenses"); Brandy M. Rapp,
Sell v. United States: Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to Criminal Defendants, 38 U Rich L Rev 1047, 1071 (2004) (arguing that "the Court failed to
define and clarify key terms" that may result in the administration of drugs with "irreversible harmful side effects").

597

598

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2005:

tutional rights.' But this objection incorrectly assumes that
withholding unwanted medication will always lead to greater
individual constitutional protections, overlooking the full set of
harms associated with the continued inability to try a criminal
defendant.
In assessing the permissibility of involuntary medication,
prior scholarship has failed to consider the consequences of allowing criminal defendants to remain unfit for trial. Leaving a
criminal defendant incompetent entails serious implications that
go further than the government's interest in prosecution.' For
some defendants, a temporary commitment to a mental institution in order to restore competency could result in a lifetime confinement for a criminal charge for which they were never convicted.7
The Constitution prohibits trying a mentally incompetent
criminal defendant to ensure that the defendant will receive a
fair trial.' But, in practice, the determination that a defendant is
incompetent deprives the defendant of a trial altogether Involuntary medication for the purpose of competency prevents this
privation by allowing the defendant to resolve the criminal
charges against him. The trial process implicates constitutionally
prescribed due process rights that the defendant could not exert
if he remained incompetent.
This Comment argues that forcible medication administered
to render a defendant competent to stand trial not only protects
the government's interest in prosecution, but also the criminal
defendant's interest not to be held indefinitely without trial. Part
I examines the current plight of the permanently incompetent
criminal defendant. Part II describes the jurisprudence behind
the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs. Finally,

5 See, for example, John R. Hayes, Sell v. United States: Is Competency Enough to
ForciblyMedicate a CriminalDefendant? 94 J Crim L & Criminol 657, 657 (2004) (arguing that forcible medication undermines the "constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair
trial"); Megan Quinlan, Note, ForcibleMedication and PersonalAutonomy: The Case of
Charles Thomas Sell, 84 BU L Rev 275, 299 (2004) (arguing that the decision "does little
to increase the protection of the defendant's constitutional rights").
6 For a discussion of the costs and burdens of the incompetency process, see Bruce J.
Winick, Incompetency to Stand Tr'al: An Assessment of Costs and Benefts, and a ProposalforReform, 39 Rutgers L Rev 243, 245-58 (1987).
7 Bruce J. Winick, RestructuringCompetency to Stand Thial, 32 UCLA L Rev 921,
938 (1985).
8 Medina v California,505 US 437, 449 (1992).
9 Grant H. Morris, Ansar M. Haroun, and David Naimark, Competency to Stand
Tial on Trial, 4 Houston J Health L & Poly 193, 193 (2004).
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Part III reexamines forcible medication in light of the consequences of permanent incompetency.
I. THE UNDUE CONFINEMENT OF PERMANENTLY INCOMPETENT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

The prohibition against trying an incompetent criminal defendant is a well-established principle, rooted in English common
law, and later adopted by American common law.'" The Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees that "no person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."" The Sixth Amendment establishes components
of a criminal defendant's trial rights 2 that have been incorpo3
rated into a constitutional due process right to a fair trial. The
Fourteenth4 Amendment makes these guarantees binding upon
the states.'
The 1966 decision Pate v Robinson15 firmly established that
"the conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process, and that state procedures must be adequate to protect this right." 6 The Court held that the state's failure to observe procedures adequate to protect the defendant's
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent deprived him
of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 7 The Court reaffirmed
that the Constitution prohibits the trial of an incompetent criminal defendant in the 1992 decision Medina v California.1 The
Court noted that it had long recognized that "[t]he criminal trial
of an incompetent defendant violates due process." 9
The Supreme Court describes fitness to stand trial as (1) the
capacity to assist defense counsel; and (2) the present capacity to

10 Cooper v Oklahoma, 517 US 348, 356-62 (1996).
11 US Const Amend V.
12 US Const Amend VI.
13 See Drope v Missouri, 420 US 162, 171-72 (1975). See also Jfiggins v Nevada, 504
US 127, 139-40 (1992) (Kennedy concurring) ("Competence to stand trial is rudimentary,
for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent
without penalty for doing so.").
14 US Const Amend XIV.
15 383 US 375 (1966).
16 Id at 385.
17 Id.

18 505 US 437 (1992).
19 Id at 453.
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understand the proceedings against him.2" The Court adopted
this formulation in the 1960 decision Dusky v United States.2 ' To
be competent to stand trial, the Court held that the accused must
have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding... [and] a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."2 2 In other words, a defendant must be able to understand
the nature and object of the proceedings, consult with counsel
and assist in preparing his own defense.2"
Due process requires that a trial court hold a competency
hearing whenever doubt as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial
2 5 the Court
arises.2 4 In Drope v Missouzi,
held that the failure to
inquire into the defendant's competency deprived him of his due
process right.26 The Court emphasized that even if a defendant is
competent at the beginning of trial, the trial court must be sensitive to any changes that might render the accused unfit to proceed at any time throughout the duration of trial.2
These cases lay the constitutional framework that protects
the trial rights of an incompetent criminal defendant. But, although the bar against trying an incompetent defendant primarily serves to protect the rights of the accused,28 the prohibition
often imposes heavy burdens on the defendant.2 9 The determination of incompetency suspends the criminal proceedings, and
commits the defendant to a secure mental hospital in order to
render him fit for trial.30 For those defendants unable to be restored to competency, this commitment is indefinite and may
even exceed the maximum sentence for the crime charged.3 '
20

Dusky v UnitedStates, 362 US 402, 402 (1960).

21 362 US 402 (1960).
22

Id.

23

Drope vMissouri,420 US at 162, 171 (1975).

24

Id at 173.

25

420 US 162 (1975).

26

Id at 172.
Id at 181.

27

28 Professor Richard Bonnie suggests that the incompetency doctrine also serves
societal interests by preserving the criminal justice process's moral dignity and by ensuring the reliability of the outcomes in criminal cases. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of CriminalDefendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U Miami L Rev 539 (1993).
See also Bruce J. Winick, Criminal Law; Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and
Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposaland a Response to ProfessorBonnie, 85 J Crim L &
Criminol 571 (1995).
29 Winick, 32 UCLA L Rev at 925 (cited in note 7).
30 Id at 924, 938.
.1 Id at 938. For anecdotal and empirical evidence of indefinite confinement prior to
1972, see Grant H. Morris and J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
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While the Supreme Court has placed a constitutional limit
on the duration of incompetency commitment,3 2 in practice, unfit
defendants continue to be held in treatment facilities for an indeterminate amount of time.33 Part A of this section describes the
decision prohibiting the indefinite confinement of incompetent
criminal defendants. Part B describes the responses to this decision by states, courts, and defendants, and explains how these
responses have inhibited the decision's efficacy.

A.

Jackson v Indiana

The Supreme Court held the indefinite confinement of permanently incompetent criminal defendants unconstitutional in
the 1972 decision Jackson v Indiana.' In 1968, 27-year-old
Theon Jackson was arrested for two separate purse-snatchings
involving the combined value of $9.00. 3' The Court identified
Jackson as a "mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of
a pre-school child." 36 Jackson could neither read nor write, and
was otherwise unable to communicate except through limited
sign language.3 7 Two psychiatrists found Jackson incompetent to
stand trial, and both testified that Jackson was unlikely to ever
be restored to fitness.38 Despite this testimony, the trial court
committed Jackson to the Department of Mental Health until it
could certify that Jackson was competent to stand trial.3 9
The Court found Jackson's commitment unconstitutional.4 °
The Court ruled that a person "cannot be held more than the
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there
is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in
the foreseeable future."a ' The record sufficiently established that
Jackson lacked a substantial probability to ever fully participate

Commitment ofPermanentlyIncompetent CriminalDefendants,27 UC Davis L Rev 1, 35 (1993).
32 Jackson vlndiana,406 US 715, 719 (1972).
33 See Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 9-33 (cited in note 31).
3 406 US 715 (1972).
35 Id at 717.
36 Id.

37 Id.
38 Jackson, 406 US at 718.
39 Id at 718-19.
40 Id at 720.
41 Id at 738.
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in his trial.42 Therefore, his continued commitment exceeded the
constitutional limit.43
The Court provided two constitutional grounds for its decision. The Court found that: (1) Jackson had been denied equal
protection because he was committed under more lenient standards than those required under civil commitments; and (2)
Jackson had been denied due process because he was committed
to restore competency though this restoration was infeasible.'
The Court held that the state could not constitutionally commit
Jackson for an indefinite period of time simply because he was
incompetent to stand trial for the charges filed against him.45
The decision placed a constitutional limit on the duration of
competency commitments for all criminal defendants. The Court
held that the determination that a defendant lacks a substantial
probability of restoration requires that the state either release
the defendant or initiate customary civil commitment proceedings.46 Moreover, the Court noted that "even if it is determined
that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his
continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that
goal."47
Courts repeatedly note that "Jackson is an enormously important decision " in cases involving mentally disordered individuals.49 But despite prohibiting the indeterminate commitment
of incompetent criminal defendants, the decision has had "little
impact on these practices."" The legislative, judicial, and individual responses to Jackson demonstrate that incompetent
criminal defendants continue to be unduly confined.
B.

Response to Jackson

The response to Jackson by state legislatures, lower courts,
and defendants indicate that the decision has failed to compel
comprehensive change in competency commitments. "A review of
42 Jackson, 406 US at 738-39.

43 Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 8 (cited in note 31).
44 Jackson, 406 US at 723-39.
41 Id at 720.
46 Id at 738.
47 Id.
48 Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 8 (cited in note 31) (citations omitted).
49 Id.

50 Michael L. Perlin, "Forthe Misdemeanor Outlaw: The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalizationof Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities,52 Ala L Rev 193,
204(2000).
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legislation in the fifty states and the District of Columbia reveals
that Jackson has been ignored or circumvented in a majority of
jurisdictions."5 1 The Jackson court's failure to define key terms in
its decision has led lower courts to issue conflicting decisions.5 2
Incompetent defendants confined indefinitely generally fail to
invoke Jackson.3 The decision explicitly protects unfit criminal
defendants, but these responses indicate that defendants continue to suffer severe consequences when found incompetent.
1.

State legislative responses to Jackson.

Many states substantially revised their incompetency commitment procedures as a result of Jackson, "minimizing the gross
abuse of incompetency commitment that existed prior to the
Court's decision." 54 However, many states failed to fully implement Jackson by ignoring or circumventing the decision in some
way. 5 These states incorporated the specific language of Jackson
into their statutes, but failed to follow the spirit of the decision.
Jackson requires treatment to restore competency to cease if
there is no "substantial probability that [the defendant] will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."56 In other words, the
treatment must stop if the defendant is permanently incompetent. Some states ignore Jackson by requiring permanently incompetent defendants to be detained until their competence has
been restored. These states escape Jackson by refusing to identify these defendants as permanently unfit.
Other states have disregarded Jackson by imposing a
lengthy period of treatment before acknowledging that the defendant is permanently incompetent.5" These states tie the
maximum length of treatment to the maximum possible sentence
51 Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 78 (cited in note 31).
52 See, for example, Ohio vSullivan, 739 NE2d 788, 793 (Ohio 2001) (invalidating the
mandatory commitment of an incompetent defendant based on the seriousness of the
crime charged regardless of likelihood to restore); Farrellv United States, 646 A2d 963,
965-66 (DC Ct App 1994) (upholding a mandatory commitment for sixty days regardless
of likelihood to restore).
53 Winick, 32 UCLA L Rev at 941 (cited in note 7).
54 Id at 940.
5 Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 9-33 (cited note 31).
56 Jackson, 406 US at 738.
67 Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia
allow indeterminate commitment by committing criminal defendant until they attain
competency, though such attainment is unlikely. Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at
13 n 57 (cited in note 31).
6" Id at 16-17.
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for the crime charged.5 9 In four states, the maximum length of
treatment is the maximum possible sentence.6' This allows the
defendant to potentially be held for life. Unfortunately, because
these states place a limit on commitment, these confinements
cannot be considered "indeterminate" and do not violate the letter of Jackson.
Moreover, the Court's mandate to "release or commit" the
permanently incompetent defendant has led other states to
abuse civil commitment proceedings. The language of the decision technically permits indeterminate commitments of incompetent defendants as long as the state "institute[s] the customary
civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit
indefinitely any other citizen."6 Four states avoid the Jackson
problem by committing incompetent defendants through the civil
commitment process. 2 However, in these cases, the defendant
will not be treated for incompetency at all. 3
2.

Judicial interpretations of Jackson.

Both state and federal courts have struggled to interpret the
Supreme Court's language in Jackson, resulting in a collection of
ambiguous case law. For example, in 1999, appellate courts in
Ohio took different views as to the constitutionality of state provisions that required a period of confinement regardless of the
possibility of restoration. One court found that a trial court had
acted properly in committing a sex offender, even though it was
unlikely that he would ever regain competency.' Only a few
months earlier, another court held that an incompetent defendant could not be committed for a mandatory period of time if
there was evidence that he could not be restored to competency
in the near future.6 5
In Illinois, courts have provided conflicting standards for
maximum criminal confinement. One state appeals court held
the fifteen-year confinement of an incompetent defendant unconstitutional because the amount of time far exceeded the period
necessary to determine whether the defendant was permanently
59 Id at 17.
60
61
62

Colorado, Louisiana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id at 17 n 75.
Jackson, 406 US at 738.
Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 13-14 (cited in note 31).

6 Id.
4
65

O io vBretz, 1999 Ohio App LEXIS 6443, *19-24 (1999).
Ohio vSuilivan, 1999 Ohio App LEXIS 4768, *17 (1999).
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incompetent. 6 In contrast, another appellate court upheld an
extended five-year treatment period for an incompetent defenhad already found that "no
dant despite the fact that the court
6 7
fit.
him
render
would
treatment
Although the Supreme Court explicitly prohibited differing
standards between civil commitment and commitment based on
incompetence,68 one court has upheld a state statute enacting
"criminal commitments."6 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a state law which subjected a defendant found incompetent
to stand trial to different commitment and release criteria than
those used to civilly commit.7 ° The New Mexico Court dismissed
the argument that this standard differed from the civil commitment standard which, unlike the criminal commitment standard,
required a person to have a mental illness. The court only stated
that it is "well-established" that the government may detain
"dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand trial."7'
3.

The failure of defendants to invoke Jackson.

A finding of incompetency necessarily precludes a defendant
from asserting his rights himself. "Incompetent defendants often
are either unaware of their rights or lack the initiative or resources to assert them."72 By definition, incompetent defendants
lack the ability to understand the proceedings against them and
to aid in their own defense.73 Therefore, indefinitely confined incompetent defendants have generally been unable to bring Jackson claims on their own behalf.
As the Court noted in Dusky, "One of the reasons that the
practice of prolonged hospitalization endures is that neither judicial decisions nor the statutory pronouncements of legislatures
are self-executing.""' Without systemic procedures to prevent
indefinite confinement, 5 incompetent defendants rely on defense
66 Kulak vBelletire,498 NE2d 859, 864 (IllApp Ct 1986).
67 People vRaseaitis,467 NE2d 1098, 1104 (Ill App Ct 1984).
68 Jackson, 406 US at 730.
69 State vRotherham, 923 P2d 1131, 1138-39 (NM 1996).
70 Id at 1149.
71 Id.

72 Winick, 32 UCLA L Rev at 942 (cited in note 7).
73 362 US at 402.
74 Id.

75 Some states have statutorily required periodic reviews of incompetent defendants.
See Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 10-13 (cited in note 31). Although these
reviews are automatic and can be considered a systemic safeguard, incompetent defendante still rely on defense counsel to bring any failure to receive reviews to the attention
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counsel to assert their rights for them. But frequently, criminal
defense lawyers are either unfamiliar with mental health law, or
"neglect their incompetent clients once they have been committed. 76
The defendant's failure to invoke Jackson contributes to the
dangers of a determination of incompetency. "[T]he theory of adjudicating competency-a beneficent process to assure that the
defendant receives a fair trial-is not matched by the harsh reality of the consequences imposed on the defendant found incompetent."77 This section described the systematic burdens of the incompetency process and explained why this "harsh reality" exists. This Comment later considers these burdens against the
harms associated with involuntary medication. Before that comparison, this next section describes the interests implicated by
involuntary medication.

II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION
Prior decisions in a number of jurisdictions have found a
substantial constitutional right to refuse unwanted antipsychotic
medication. In 1971, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction of a defendant based on its finding that the state's
forcible administration of drugs affected the defendant's mental
and physical abilities at trial." The court found that the drugs
conflicted with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to appear
in court unfettered and to confront the witnesses against him.79
Similarly, in 1980, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication infringes upon a patient's protected liberty interests, and may not be imposed without affording the minimum
due process protections."0 The court found that, "at least in some
situations," persons confined in the state's custody have a constitutional right to refuse medication.8 1 The court explained that
the source of that right could best be understood as substantive
due process, or in other words, "an aspect of 'liberty' guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 2
of the court.

76 Winick, 32 UCLA L Rev at 941 (cited in note 7).

77 Morris, 4 Houston J Health L & P at 227 (cited in note 9).
78 State vMaryott, 492 P2d 239, 240 (Wash Ct App 1971).
79 Id at 243.
80 Davis vHubbard,506 F Supp 915, 938-39 (N D Ohio 1980).
8' Id at 929.
82 Id.

597]

INVOLUNTARYMEDICA TIONAND INCOMPETENCY

607

In 1981, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that antipsychotic medication may not be administered to a noninstitutionalized individual absent an emergency or court order.8 3 The
court noted that although the right to refuse "must be subordinated to various state interests," the state may administer invol84
untary medication if it satisfies the least intrusive means test.
The court stated that the "right to the least intrusive means is
derived from the right to privacy, which stands as a constitutional expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and selfdetermination as fundamental constituents of life." 5
These cases and other decisions like them help inform a
thorough analysis of the substantive rights involved in the forced
treatment of criminal defendants in order to render them competent to stand trial. Courts have found a variety of interests that
involuntary medication may invade. 6 But the most striking finding in all these cases is that they decline to assert an absolute
right to refuse antipsychotic medication.
More recently, lower courts have looked to the Supreme
8
Court decisions Washington v Harpe? and Riggins v NevadaW
to determine the scope of the government's power to involuntarily medicate criminal defendants. The Supreme Court itself relied heavily on these two prior decisions in Sell v United States9
to hold constitutional the involuntary medication of criminal defendants in the competency context. 90 Harperand Riggins constitute substantial steps in the Sell framework to determine when
involuntary medication is constitutionally permissible solely to
render a criminal defendant competent to stand trial.
A.

Washington v Harper

In Harper,the Supreme Court considered a state law authorizing the forced administration of drugs to inmates who were
gravely disabled or who represented a significant danger to
83 In re GuardianshipofRoe, 421 NE2d 40, 42 (Mass 1981).

84 Id at 60-61.
85 Id at 61 (citations omitted).
86 For a more detailed discussion of literature and case law asserting various constitutional grounds by which an inmate could refuse forced medication, see Steve Tomashefsky, Comment, Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand Tral: The Right of the Unfit
Accused to Refuse Treatmen; 52 U Chi L Rev 773, 795 n 10 (1985).
87 494 US 210 (1990).
88 504 US 127 (1992).
89 539 US 166 (2003).
90 Id at 177-83.
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themselves or others.9 1 The case involved a prison inmate with a
mental disorder who was "likely to cause harm if not treated."9 2
The Court found that the Due Process Clause allowed the state
to treat the inmate against his will, relying on the facts that the
inmate was a danger and the treatment was in his own medical
interest.9'
The Supreme Court recognized an individual's significant,
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medication, but found that this interest subject to state concerns.9 4 The state's need to administer medication was "legitimate" and "important,"9 5 and the state law authorizing involuntary treatment amounted to a constitutionally permissible accommodation between interests.9 6 Essentially, the Court found
that forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness. The danger the defendant
posed to himself and others and the finding that the treatment
was medically appropriate met this standard.

B.

Riggins v Nevada

The Supreme Court reiterated that an individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding involuntary
medication in Riggins.9 v The Court once again found the individual's liberty interest subject to the state's need to provide appropriate medical treatment.9 8 But unlike Harper,the Court found
that the state failed to meet its evidentiary burden, and reversed
Riggins' conviction and remanded for further proceedings.9 9
In its decision, the Court explained that the state failed to
demonstrate that "treatment with antipsychotic medication was
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of
others."1' ° The trial court had permitted forced medication of
Riggins without taking account of his liberty interest, with a con91 494 US at 215.
92 Id.

93 Id at 227.
94 Id.
95 Harper,494 US at 223-25.
96 Id at 236.
97 504 US at 133-34.
98 Id at 134-35.
9 Id at 138.
100 Rggins, 504 US at 135.
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sequent possibility of trial prejudice.'' The court noted that
"[w]hile trial prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential
state interest, the record here contains no finding to support a
conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was
necessary to accomplish an essential state policy." 02 Ultimately,
the Court held that a criminal defendant may discontinue antipsychotic medication if the drugs are10 3 likely to conflict with the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that
antipsychotic drugs might have side effects that would interfere
with the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial.' °" Kennedy
noted that the side effects of drugs can prejudice the accused in
two ways: (1) "by altering his demeanor in a manner that will
prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom;" and
(2) "by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel."1 5 In
language later incorporated by the Sell decision, Justice Kennedy
stated that involuntary medication would be impermissible until
knowledge of antipsychotic medication evolved to produce effective drugs with only minimal side effects.0 6
Sell v UnitedStates

C.

The Supreme Court authorized the government to involuntarily medicate a mentally ill defendant in order to render him
competent for trial in Sell. °7 Forcibly medicating an incompetent
criminal defendant to restore competency is permissible when:
(1) there are important governmental interests in trying the defendant; (2) the treatment will significantly further those interests; (3) the treatment is necessary to further those interests,
considering any less intrusive alternatives; and (4) the treatment
The Court held that if those condiis medically appropriate.'
tions are met, the Constitution allows the government to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to render the accused
competent to stand trial.
The Sell factors control only when the sole purpose of the
forced chemical treatment is to render a defendant competent to
'0' Id at 135.
102
103
04
105
106
107
108

Id at 128.
Id at 134-35.
R ggins, 504 US at 138 (Kennedy concurring).
Id at 142.
Id at 145.
539 US at 180.
Id at 180-81.
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stand trial. Justice Breyer, writing for the six-justice majority,10 9
noted that the standards should only be applied when "seeking to
determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular governmental interest,
namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to
stand trial." ° The Court explained that the state should first
look to other means by which forcible medication may be authorized before turning to the Sell conditions. Breyer stated that "[a]
court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for
that kind of purpose, if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harperrelated to
the individual's dangerousness, or purposes related to the individual's own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his
health gravely at risk.""'
The Court laid out a clear framework through which incompetent criminal defendants could be involuntarily medicated. By
stating that trial courts first utilize existing mechanisms to
medicate unfit defendants, the Court limited the instances in
which the Sell conditions could be used. Read in conjunction with
the Riggins and Harper,the decision provides stringent protections that restrict the use of involuntary medication.

III. REEXAMINING INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION IN THE SHADOW OF
PERMANENT INCOMPETENCE

The failure to administer antipsychotic medication requires
the state to reevaluate the defendant's fitness. Justice Kennedy
noted that "[i]f the State cannot render the defendant competent
without involuntary medication, then it must resort to civil
commitment . . . unless the defendant becomes competent
through other means."" 2 But the likelihood that the defendant
will achieve competency is slim. "[W]ithout taking prescribed
antipsychotic medications, it is doubtful that many mentally ill
defendants could have a change in mental status that would lead
109 Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice

Thomas maintaining that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because the district
court's order was neither a final decision nor an interlocutory order. Id at 186-87. Moreover, the dissent maintained that the majority allowed criminal defendants to "engage in
opportunistic behavior." Id at 191. Scalia explained that, "They can, for example, voluntarily take their medication until halfway through the trial, then abruptly refuse and
demand an interlocutory appeal from the order that medication continue on a compulsory
basis." Id.
'1o Id at 181.
1 Sell, 539 US at 181-82 (emphasis in original).
112 Riggins, 504 US at 145.

597]

INVOLUNTARYMEDICATIONAND INCOMPETENCY

611

to a forensic opinion supportive of restoration of competency to
stand trial.""' As a result, the decision to withhold medication is
a decision to leave the defendant permanently incompetent.
This section will reexamine the costs and benefits of involuntary medication against this background of permanent incompetence. Part A will consider the constitutional harms of involuntary medication within the framework of incompetency. Part B
will explore the benefits of involuntary medication from the
standpoint of the permanently incompetent defendant. The reexamination of involuntary medication from the context of permanent incompetency will reveal that the forcible treatment of unfit
defendants results in far lower costs and far greater benefits
than prior scholarship has maintained.
A.

The Constitutional Costs of Involuntary Medication

The right to refuse unwanted drugs implicates a number of
constitutional rights." 4 Many commentators argue that Sell does
not provide adequate safeguards to protect these rights."5 While
proponents of forcible medication have provided various responses to these arguments," 6 reexamining the claims surround113 Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand
Trial from a Clinical Perspective, 31 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement 81, 103
(2005).
114 See United States v Brandon, 158 F3d 947 (6th Cir 1998) (recognizing a First
Amendment interest in avoiding forcible medication); Mackey v Procunier,477 F2d 877,
878 (9th Cir 1973) (noting that involuntary treatment raises "serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment"); United States v Morgan, 193 F3d 252
(4th Cir 1999) (recognizing that pretrial detainees have a due process right to refuse
antipsychotic medication); United States v Santonio, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 8647 (D Utah
2001) (noting that the administration of medication may interfere with a defendant's
right to fair trial by creating a prejudicial negative demeanor); Woodland v Angus, 820 F
Supp 1497 (D Utah 1993) (acknowledging a privacy interest in avoiding forcible medication).
115 See Quinlan, 84 BU L Rev at 275 (cited in note 5) (maintaining that Sell does not
adequately address the defendant's First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments rights); Hayes,
94 J Crim L & Criminol at 657 (cited in note 5) (arguing that Sell does not adequately
protect the defendant's liberty interest to be free from unwanted medication or right to
fair trial); Dias, 55 SC L Rev at 517 (cited in note 4) (noting that the Sell court failed to
address the individual's First Amendment rights or that due process may override the
government's prosecutorial interests).
116 In response to the argument that forcible medication violates a defendant's First
Amendment rights, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law maintain that "medications, when properly used to treat the
severely mentally ill, positively promote First Amendment interests by enhancing abilities to concentrate, read, learn, and communicate." Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Sell v United
States, No. 02-5664, *26 (filed Jan 22, 2003) (available on Lexis at 2002 US Briefs 5664)
("APA/AAPL Brief"). Similarly, the American Psychological Association states that mental illnesses prevent individuals from thinking clearly, actually depriving them of their
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ing two constitutional rights in particular lends special support
in favor of forcible medication.
1.

Equal protection.

One commentator suggests that allowing the government to
forcibly medicate incompetent criminal defendants ignores the
equal protection implications of Jackson."7 The Supreme Court
emphasized in the 1972 decision that incompetent defendants
are entitled to the same "procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to
all others." ' Civil and criminal commitment cannot be distinguished." 9
Likewise, the civil and criminal distinction cannot legitimate
the disparate administration of forcible medication among civil
and criminal committees. "If incompetent criminal defendants
are civil patients, then they are entitled to the same right to
medical self-determination that other civil patients possess." 2 °
Sell violates this protection by allowing pending criminal charges
to justify coerced treatment among incompetent defendants
whereas otherwise civilly committed patients may refuse.
Contrary to what these critics claim, Sell is consistent with
Jackson, and comports with equal protection. Incompetent
criminal defendants are given the same right to refuse unwanted
medication as any other similarly situated civilly committed patient. Proponents of this equal protection argument concede that
"civilly committed patients have a right to refuse treatment with
own thought processes. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, Sell v
United States, No. 02-5664, *10 (filed Dec 19, 2002) (available on Lexis at 2002 US Briefs
5664). These arguments draw on case law recognizing the right to treatment. Rouse v
Cameron, 373 F2d 451 (DC Cir 1966) (indicating that the absence of treatment might
result in either due process or equal protection violations); Wyatt v Aderholt 503 F2d
1305 (5th Cir 1974) (basing the right to treatment under the parens patriae doctrine);
O'Connorv Donaldson,422 US 463 (1975) (discussing the right to treatment).
In recognizing a privacy interest in avoiding involuntary medication in Woodland,
the Utah court stated that the invasion on such interests is justified as a result of the
state's interest in rendering the patient competent to stand trial insofar as the following
factors are considered: (1) the extent to which the procedure may threaten the patient's
safety or health; (2) the extent of intrusion on the patient's dignitary interests in personal
privacy and bodily integrity; and (3) the community's interest in fairly and accurately
determining guilt or innocence. 820 F Supp at 1511.
117 Grant H. Morris, Mental Disorderand the Civil/CriminalDistinction,41 San Diego
L Rev 1177, 1197-1208 (2004).
118 Jackson, 406 US at 724.
119 Id at 723-30. For further discussion of the civil/criminal distinction, see Morris, 41
San Diego L Rev 1177 (cited in note 117).
120 Morris, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1202 (cited in note 117).
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antipsychotic medication unless they lack the capacity to make
treatment decisions. " 121 Sell relies on this principle, implicitly
finding that incompetent defendants lack the capacity to make
treatment decisions.
Courts have consistently held that involuntarily committed
patients may lose the right to make treatment decisions upon a
judicial determination of incapacity. In Rivers v Katz, 2 the New
York Supreme Court held that a judicial finding of incapacity to
make a reasoned decision as to one's own treatment is required
before an involuntarily committed patient may be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs against his or her will. In Steele v
Hamilton County Community Mental Health Board,2 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that, a court can issue an order permitting
administration of antipsychotic medication without a finding
that the involuntarily committed patient was dangerous if the
court found that the patient lacked the capacity to give consent
regarding treatment, the medication was in his best interest, and
no less intrusive treatment would be as effective. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts similarly held in Rogers v Comm'r of
Dep't of Mental Health24 that involuntarily committed civil patients do not lose the right to make treatment decisions unless a
judge finds them incompetent during incompetency proceedings.
The Sell court adheres to this line of decisions.
Proponents of the equal protection argument contend that a
separate judicial finding of incapacity to make treatment decisions must be made before involuntary medication can be administered. 25 However, the standards that the Supreme Court administers in cases of involuntary medication echo these prior
standards for a judicial finding of incapacity, making a separate
finding unnecessary. As in Steele, the Court in Sell requires that
the medication be in the patient's best interest, 26 and that no
less intrusive means of treatment exists.127 Sell implicitly holds
that incompetent criminal defendants lack the capacity to make
treatment decisions. In other words, a finding of incompetence to
stand trial is also a judicial determination of incapacity to make
treatment decisions.
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id at 1204.
67 NY2d 485 (1986).
736 NE2d 10 (Ohio 2000).
458 NE2d 308 (Mass 1983).
Morris, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1202 (cited in note 117).
Sell, 539 US at 181.
Id.
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Competence to refuse medication is described as the ability
to weigh the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed
medication. 12 An unfit defendant does not have either the present capacity to assess the proceedings against him, or the ability
to aid in his own defense.'29 These inabilities relate directly to
the defendant's ability to assess the advantages and disadvantages involved in his restoration to competence.
Moreover, Sell in no way inhibits a competent criminal defendant's ability to refuse medication. "If the confined individual
competently chooses to refuse treatment, even if such decision
may prolong his or her confinement, the individual's interestone that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized to be a
significant, constitutionally protected liberty interest-should
outweigh any claimed governmental interest in coercing treatment." 3 ' The decision preserves the right to refuse medication,
but only if the defendant has been restored to competence.
The harms associated with forced treatment are difficult to
determine because the effects of drugs on an individual defendant cannot be determined until the medication is administered.
The American Psychiatric Association ("APA") and American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law ("AAPL") argue that any
concerns regarding the involuntary treatment of a criminal defendant are "properly considered at a later stage, after competence is restored."13 ' In their amicus curiae brief filed in support
of the government in Sell, the two organizations explain that any
concerns may ultimately become moot once the defendant has
been restored to competence. 32
Medical treatment improves the defendant's functionality,
possibly enabling him to make decisions that he could not make
before. 133 "The defendant may plead guilty and avoid trial; adverse effects often will not occur at all; and any adverse effects
are broadly subject to being controlled by adjustment of medication, so the mere possibility of such effects should not stand in
the way of restoring competence."'34 As one commentator noted, a
recent study has shown that "involuntary medication did not
limit the potential for plea bargaining, nor did involuntary medi128

Id.

129 Dusky, 362 US at 402.
130 Morris, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1205 (cited in note 117) (emphasis added).
131 APA/AAPL Brief at *9 (cited in note 116).
132 Id.

133 Pinals, 31 New Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement at 108 (cited in note 113).
134 APA/AAPL Brief at *9 (cited in 116).
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cation prevent successful insanity plea[s]." 5 This study indicates that the defendant should make the decision to refuse
medication only after he is rendered competent.
2.

The Right to Fair Trial

The involuntary medication of incompetent criminal defendants is constitutionally permissible "only if the treatment is...
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine
the fairness of the trial."1 36 Still, some commentators maintain
that the decision fails to adequately protect the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights." These opponents argue that the effects of
antipsychotic drugs on a defendant's demeanor and cognitive
abilities will "always hinder a defendant's right to fair trial."1 3
Consequently, forcible medication would never be permitted for
the sole purpose of rendering a mentally ill defendant competent
to stand trial. 3 9
These concerns echo those expressed by Justice Kennedy in
his concurrence in Riggins.4' Justice Kennedy viewed involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs as a "serious threat to a
defendant's right to a fair trial.""' While he believed that officials could involuntarily administer medication upon "an extraordinary showing by the State," Justice Kennedy expressed
doubt that such a showing could be made in most cases, "given
our present understanding of the properties of these drugs."'42
Justice Kennedy's concurrence relied heavily on the amicus
brief filed by the APA in Riggins supporting the defendant.'
Since then, knowledge of these drugs has dramatically improved,
and in Sell, the APA shifted their position, arguing in favor of
forcible medication rather than against it."' In their brief in support of the government, the APA and AAPL argued that
135 Pinals, 31 New Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement at 103 (cited in note 113).
136

Sell, 539 US at 180.

137 See, for example, Hayes, 94 J Crim L & Criminol at 657 (cited in note 5) (arguing

that a defendant's right to a fair trial is jeopardized when antipsychotic medication is
administered involuntarily to a defendant solely to render him competent to stand trial).
138 Id at 680.
'39

Id at 681.

141

Id.

142

Id at 139.

14o 505 US at 138.

143 See Rggins, 504 US at 141-44. For the APA amicus brief, see Brief Amicus Curiae

of the American Psychiatric Association Supporting Petitioner, Riggins v United States,
No. 90-8466, *1 (filed Nov 21, 1991) (available on Lexis at 1990 US Briefs 8466).
144 See APA/AAPL Brief at *9 (cited in note 116).
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"medication typically enhances rather than impairs a defendant's
ability to participate effectively at trial."'4 5 The Sell amicus brief
states that adverse effects will often not occur at all and any adverse effects that do surface can often be controlled through the
adjustment of medication.'4 6 The APA and AAPL concluded that
"[t]he mere possibility of such effects should not stand in the way
of restoring competence." 47
Moreover, Riggins set forth the right to discontinue psychotropic medications that might interfere with the defendant's
right to fair trial. If a criminal defendant is still being medicated
involuntarily as his trial date draws near, he can move for a
Riggins hearing if he believes that such medication will adversely affect his demeanor at trial."4 "At that point, deciding
whether or not the medication might interfere with the fairness
of a defendant's trial would require little speculation on the part
of the court."'4 9 The hearing would require the court to weigh
actual existing side effects, rather than conjecture. 5 ' Sell and
Riggins provide the robust procedural safeguards necessary to
protect the fair trial rights of the defendant.
The danger that forcible medication poses to a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights is trivial and speculative in comparison
to the real consequences of a determination of permanent incompetence. Prohibiting involuntary medication will invariably lead
to permanent incompetency. 15' "Restoration of competence is often unlikely without antipsychotic medication, and the lack of
other effective alternatives could mean a defendant may remain
incompetent to stand trial indefinitely." 5 ' Opponents of involuntary medication provide no option other than to leave criminal
defendants in an indeterminate state of incompetence. As a result, Jackson is implicated, forcing states to "release or commit"
the defendant.
Some states implemented statutory procedures for "discharge hearings" or "not-guilty-only trials" in order to adjudicate
146Id.
146

Id.

147Id.
14sBrief and Argument for Amici Curiae Mental Health Association in Illinois and
Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic Mental Health Project, In Re Robert S, No. 96773, *9
(filed April 26, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 3221773).
149 Id at *15.
150 Id at *9.
151 Pinals, 31 New Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement at 102 (cited in note 113).
152 Hayes, 94 J Crim L & Criminol at 679 (cited in note 5).
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the release or committal of the defendant.'53 These procedures
provide little protection for the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights since many courts do not consider these proceedings to be
trials, and so fail to provide the same constitutional guarantees.'54 Consequently, these hearings deprive the defendant of all
of his trial rights including jury trial, confrontation, compulsory
process for defense witnesses, the presentation of personal testiof either innocence or guilt
mony in defense, and an adjudication
55
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, even if these hearings result in release, the
charges against the defendant may not be resolved. The Jackson
court merely requires the defendant's release, not the dismissal
of criminal charges. 56 As a result, defendants are unable to resolve any allegations of criminal conduct.
The failure of states to enforce Jackson partially stems from
this inability to adequately deal with permanently incompetent
criminal defendants without some minimal deprivation of the
incompetent defendants' trial rights. In order to resolve the indefinite confinement of permanently incompetent criminal defendants, some judgment as to the charges against the defendant
must be made. As long as the defendant remains incompetent,
this judgment will always result in some deprivation of rights,
making the constitutionality of these types of hearings questionable.

1 57

Allowing defendants to be rendered competent under Sell
avoids this situation. "Although this improved functional autonomy might result in a defendant being returned to the criminal
justice system, the defendant would be best equipped to deal
with legal and personal choices if able to more adeptly understand their situation and the proceedings they face."

5

The com-

petent defendant is in a better position to assess whether he can
properly utilize his trial rights or should return to a state of unfitness.
The Court also clearly recognized the importance of inquiring "about trial-related side effects and risks-the answers to
which could have helped determine whether forced medication
153 See 725 ILCS Ann 5/104-25(b); Del Code Ann 11 § 404.
154See, for example, Raseaitis, 467 NE2d at 1104.
155 American Bar Association, ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 242 n
5 (1989) ("ABA Mental Health Standards").
116 Id at 244.
1.7Id at 239.
158 Pinals, 31 New Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement at 108 (cited in note 113).
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was warranted on trial competence grounds alone,"" 9 and set out
important safeguards to ensure that the defendant would only be
medicated when the balance of interests dictated. The Court
states that, "Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with communications with counsel, prevent
rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to
express emotions are matters important in determining the permissibility of medication to restore competence." 6 ' Ultimately,
Sell provides the broadest protection of trial rights.
The Benefits of Involuntary Medication in Practice

B.

Involuntary medication has different implications depending
on the severity of the crime for which the defendant is charged.
Many state statutes decline to tie the maximum length of the
incompetency commitment to the maximum sentence term authorized for the offense charged.'6 1 Therefore, length of commitment may be the same whether the defendant was charged with
a misdemeanor or serious crime. From that context, the benefits
of involuntary medication are greater for less serious crimes.
1.

Misdemeanors

A misdemeanor is generally thought of as a minor crime, defined as "[a] crime that is less serious than a felony and is [usually] punishable by fine, penalty, forfeiture, or confinement
([usually] for a brief term) in a place other than prison (such as a
county jail)."' One study found that "a substantial majority of
defendants hospitalized for competency evaluation were charged
with misdemeanors."'6 3 Although some courts in the past have
been hesitant to seek involuntary medication in minor offenses," its careful use could considerably reduce the unnecessary confinement of criminal defendants hospitalized for competency issues.
The harm associated with indefinite confinement is most
compelling in the case of the misdemeanant. "An involuntary
"9 Sell, 539 US at 185.
160 Id.
161 Winick, 32 UCLA L Rev at 942 (cited in note 7).
162 Black's Law Dictionary1014 (West 7th ed 1999).
163

Id at 941-42.

164 See, for example, Brandon, 158 F3d at 947 (holding that the government's interest
in adjudicating a minor offense was not sufficiently compelling); Santonio, 2001 US Dist
LEXIS 8647, "1 (same).
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commitment for treatment to restore competence may extend
well beyond the maximum sentence imposable for a relatively
minor offense." 6 ' The Sell court stated that "[t]he potential for
future confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the
strength of the need for prosecution."'66 The potential for future
confinement for defendants charged with a misdemeanor could in
no way vitiate, and in some ways strengthens, the need for
prosecution.
Some criminal defendants may refuse treatment without a
complete understanding of the criminal consequences of conviction. "If convicted, many of these defendants would pay a small
fine or receive a period of probation. Instead, they might spend
months or years confined as incompetent."' 6 7 Adhering to the Sell
factors, any medication would pose no significant side effects 6 '
and would be the least intrusive means to attain competency. 169
The criminal defendant could easily lack this information and
therefore make an uninformed decision in refusing treatment.
Moreover, in determining competency, most states do not
distinguish misdemeanants from felons. Because of this, criminal
defendants charged with misdemeanors are more likely to endure punishment disproportionate to their crime. "As a matter of
practice, defendants awaiting evaluations to determine their incompetency to stand trial have regularly been sent to maximum
security forensic hospitals, regardless of the underlying criminal
charge, even though such hospitalization is often not necessary
or may even be counter-productive."' Forcing misdemeanants
into maximum security forensic hospitals may worsen the defendant's psychotic problems by placing him in an environment that
is counterproductive to his treatment.
2.

Serious, but nonviolent crimes.

In May 1997, Charles T. Sell, a St. Louis area dentist was
arrested for filing false insurance claims.' 7 ' Nearly two years
later in April 1999, a court found Sell unfit to stand trial and
returned him to the United States Medical Center for Federal

168

ABA Mental
Sell, 539 US
Winick, 85 J
Sell, 539 US

169

Id.

170

Perlin, 52 Ala L Rev at 201 (cited in note 50).
Douglas Mossman, Is Prosecution "MedicallyAppropiate ., 31 New Eng J on

165

166
167

171

Health Standards at 179 (cited in note 155).
at 180.
Crim L & Criminol at 580 (cited in note 28).
at 181.

Crim & Civ Confinement 15, 28 (2005).
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Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. 7 2 At the time that Sell's case
was heard before the Supreme Court, "six years after his arrest
and more than four years after he was first found incompetent to
stand trial, he remain[ed], imprisoned, psychotic, and untreated."'73
Although the Court found the use of forcible medication
solely to render a criminal defendant competent to stand trial
constitutionally permissible, the Court held that the government
had failed to provide sufficient evidence to authorize such use in
the case of Sell.' 74 More than a year after the Supreme Court decision, Sell remains incompetent, still confined in a federal prison
hospital despite his wish to proceed to trial. 7 ' Approaching his
eighth year of confinement, Sell's pretrial76 commitment remains
indefinite even in the shadow of Jackson.
Defendants charged with serious, but nonviolent crimes present the greatest challenge to the Jackson release-or-commit
mandate. The seriousness of the crime substantially reduces the
likelihood that the government will drop the charges. Yet the
nonviolent nature of the charge suggests that the defendant
might also fail to meet civil commitment standards.7 7 As the Supreme Court once noted, "a mentally retarded defendant accused
of a nonviolent crime may be found incompetent to stand trial
7
but not necessarily subject to involuntary civil commitment." 1
This dilemma has urged some commentators to suggest that
it may be in the defendant's best interests not to raise the competency issues at all. 1 79 Recognizing the adverse consequences of a
determination of unfitness, the American Bar Association
("ABA") states in the commentary accompanying its Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards that the "severe consequences
172

Id at 29.

173 Id at 55 (citations omitted).
174 Sell, 539 US at 186.
175 Carolyn Tuft, Sell Is Sent to Different Prison Hospital,St Louis Post-Dispatch BI
(Nov 30, 2004).
176 One commentator questions whether Sell might overrule Jackson "sub silencio."
Morris, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1204 (cited in note 117).
117 Cooper,517 US at 384 n 24.
178 Id.

In fact, soon after the Jacksondecision, Robert Burt and Norval Morris went so far
as to suggest the abolition of the incompetency plea. See Robert A. Burt and Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U Chi L Rev 66 (1972).
However, their approach found little favor with the courts because of its incompatibility
with settled law. Bonnie, 47 U Miami L Rev at 542 (cited in note 28). For a rehabilitation
of the Burt and Morris approach, suggesting a waiver of the right rather than the abolition, see Winick, 39 Rutgers L Rev 243 (cited in note 6).
179
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traditionally attendant upon a determination of incompetency"
may lead defense counsel to "conclude that it is better for a technically incompetent defendant to proceed to trial."' The commentary continues, noting that "some commentators have contended that defense counsel not only is permitted, but in some
instances is required, to decline to raise the issue of a client's
possible incompetence if it seems to be in the client's best interests to forgo that procedure."'
But ultimately, such an option is constitutionally inviable
due to defense counsel's obligation to inform the court of the defendant's possible incompetence.8 2 The trial of an incompetent
defendant is necessarily invalid as a violation of due process, and
neither the defendant nor his counsel may waive such protection. 8 3 The Supreme Court states in Pate, "it is contradictory to
argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly
or intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court determine his
capacity to stand trial.'8 4 Given the inability to waive fitness,
involuntary medication provides the only constitutionally permissible means for a defendant to proceed to trial in order to
avoid the "potentially greater hardship and injustice to a defendant stemming from an incompetency commitment."'8 5 By giving
the defendant another means to resolve the criminal charges
against him, the incompetent defendant can avoid postevaluation commitments to mental health facilities made without "regard to the nature of the crime, the defendant's dangerousness, or the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's Jackson
18 6
v. Indianadecision."
3.

Serious, violent crimes.

Involuntary medication in serious, violent crimes has the
greatest potential for abuse, since the government's interest in
prosecuting this category of crime is the greatest. "The more serious the crime charged, the greater is the state's interest in
prosecuting the defendant."8 7 The state will be less willing to
allow the charges to be dismissed, and is more likely to opt for
180 ABA Mental Health Standards at 179 (cited in note 155).

...Id at 180.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Pate,383 US at 384.
185 ABA Mental Health Standards at 179 (cited in note 155).
186 Perlin, 52 Ala L Rev at 207 (cited in note 50).
187 Morris and Meloy, 27 UC Davis L Rev at 17 (cited in note 31).
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commitment. The danger that, without medication, the defendant will serve a lengthy confinement without a conviction is
great.
Opponents of forcible medication emphasize the danger of
wrongful conviction were an incompetent criminal defendant to
go to trial. However, the incompetency status does not avoid the
penal impositions associated with conviction. Incompetency
bears a stigma of guilt that often subjects the defendant to confinement in order to ensure that the defendant does not escape
punishment through a finding of unfitness. The presumption
that the accused is innocent until proven guilty is constitutionally required.' However, there is often an "unstated but lingering assumption that any defendant on whose 'behalf the incompetency status is raised is, in fact, 'factually guilty' of the underlying crime."'89
The assumption of guilt has led to the abuse of civil commitment proceedings in order to punish criminal defendants
without a finding of guilt. The incompetency status is somehow
viewed as an indicator of guilt. 9 ° "Although there is nothing in
the invocation of the incompetency status that at all concedes
factual guilt.

.

., it is assumed by all that the defendant did, in

fact, commit the crime."' 9'
The seriousness of the crime for which the defendant is
charged facilitates the finding of dangerousness that most civil
commitment statutes require. Studies have shown that psychiatrists are more likely to find a defendant dangerous, the more
serious the alleged crime."' Courts have found little distinction

between the "dangerousness" of defendants for whom there is
only probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and
defendants who, under an insanity plea, admit that they have
committed the offenses charged.'93 Although the difference be-

188 Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice.").
189 Perlin, 52 Ala L Rev at 206 (cited in note 50).
190 Michael L. Perlin, 'Everything's a Little Upside Down, As a Matter of Fact the
Wheels Have Stopped: The Fraudulence of the Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4
Houston J Health L & Poly 239, 246 (2004).
191 Id.

192 Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The FailureofPsychiatricPredicationsof
Dangerousness:Clearand Con vincing Evidence, 29 Rutgers L Rev 1084, 1096 (1976).
193 Cziminal and Quasi-CriminalProceedings, 4-20 Treatise on Health Care Law §
20.07.
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tween the two is significant, "courts rarely have been persuaded
by this distinction."19 4
Involuntary medication in order to render a defendant fit to
stand trial ensures that punishment will not be inflicted unless
the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offenses he is charged with. Civil commitment does not provide the same safeguards, and in fact the court
may still make a finding of guilt by allowing the prosecution to
prove that the accused committed the crime by meeting a lower a
standard of proof. A New Mexico statute requires that if the
court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent defendant committed the crime charged and had previously found the defendant dangerous, the defendant must be
detained in a secure, locked facility for a period not to exceed the
maximum sentence available had he been convicted in a criminal
proceeding. 9 ' In other words, the statute potentially allows the
court to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without requiring the defendant's guilt to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
CONCLUSION

A criminal defendant has a substantial right to refuse medical treatment. However, that right may be overcome by the government's interest in prosecuting the defendant, and more importantly, the defendant's right not to be confined without trial.
A determination of incompetency suspends the criminal proceedings, committing the defendant to a mental institution until fit
for trial. For those permanently incompetent, this commitment
could far exceed any punishment they may have received if convicted.
The framework laid out by the Sell decision to involuntarily
medicate the incompetent provides robust protections for the
criminal defendant. Moreover, forcible medication allows the defendant to proceed to trial and exercise his rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. Consequently, the ability to stand trial, even
under forcible medication, provides greater constitutional protections than the indeterminate state attendant upon incompetency.

194 Id.
195 Id at 253.
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